Crash Course on Uranium Enrichment and The Production of Atomic Weapons.
The Sanford Report: Issue # 2
Note: This is a highly simplified explanation of how making an atomic weapon works. There are many technical challenges related to production of a complete nuclear weapon. However, the overall concepts of fission are not overly complex. Easy in theory, difficult in practice. -The Author.
There are three basic and many subsidiary types of nuclear weapons. (I did say crash course.) First there are uranium gun type weapons. These are not terribly complicated devices. In fact, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima Japan was a gun type device and wasn’t even tested before it was dropped. The scientists who created Little Boy were that sure it would work. Second there are implosion types. Implosion weapons use plutonium (primarily), though seem to be capable of working if made with uranium and assembled and designed correctly. Implosion designs are more complicated than a gun type but seem to produce a better bang so to speak. Finally, there are thermonuclear bombs, also known by the colloquial “hydrogen bomb”, the most complex type currently in use. There are additional theoretical designs which might be mentioned, but for now, just remember these three types: Gun Type, Implosion Type, Multi-Stage Thermonuclear (commonly, but incorrectly called Hydrogen bombs because of the inclusion of hydrogen isotopes in the boost phase).
It is important to point something out now. Nuclear weapons are not difficult to make. If you have the materials. It is for this reason that governments attempt to pretend to be careful about who can enrich uranium or plutonium to weapons grade. Because any half-knowledgeable person with access to the internet can, in theory assemble a basic working bomb. Granted they might very well die of radiation poisoning later, but that would be cold comfort to whomever died in the atomic blast of their weapon. The name of the game in nonproliferation is preventing disagreeable folks, or folks you disagree with, from having the correct ingredients. Now things get more complicated because every signatory of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, I.E. Iran, has the innate right to enrich uranium and have nuclear reactors.
“Article IV: 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.” ~Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
The wording of the non-proliferation treaty is not an accident. There are real, tangible, peaceful, benefits to atomic research. Medical isotopes used in the treatment of cancer and other disorders come from enrichment programs and nuclear research. Have you been to a local hospital? Perhaps you noticed a sign that said, “Nuclear Medicine Department”? In a country such as Iran, which has extreme difficulty procuring advanced medications for its population because of sanctions, having the ability to produce medical and scientific research isotopes is a real and even noble goal. How would we feel if some other nation ordered our factories, research laboratories, and universities to stop making life saving drugs? Remember, enrichment isn’t only used for weapons.
On sanctions, briefly. Technically most sanctions do not limit the importation of life saving medicines by Iran. But… sanctions target money. Iran has placed several orders for medications in 2020, all were denied because the companies they were attempting to buy medicines from had been threatened with criminal actions by the United States government if those companies accepted payments from the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran was trying to order flu vaccines during the height of the Covid-19 pandemic in that country… If you’ve ever wondered to yourself “Why do they hate us?” Read the previous paragraph again.
Now, on to the enrichment stuff. The primary element we need to know about when we’re talking about enrichment is Uranium. It has the atomic number of 92. But not just any old type of Uranium will do, if you want to run a nuclear reactor or make an atomic bomb. There are several different types, including U-232, U-233, U-234, U-235, U-236 and U-238. When you mine Uranium from the ground 99% of the stuff is the stable U-238 version. For a reactor or a bomb, you’ll need one of the fissile forms of Uranium, U-233 or U-235. U-233 is a byproduct of bombarding Thorium-232 with a neutron, bonding to form U-233. U-233 has been used in several atomic weapons and nuclear reactors. U-233 is easier to obtain than Plutonium-239 (Also a fissile material), and creates more efficient fission reactions than U-235, but not quite as good as P-239.
The primary element we’ll be talking about, and the specific form of uranium being referenced when talking about enrichment is U-235. U-235 is a fissile material usable in both reactors and atomic weapons. In natural uranium ore, only about 0.70% of all the atoms are the U-235 type. The minutely heavier U-238 will make up 99.3% (roughly) of all the particles in any lump of natural uranium ore. The process of separating the U-238 from the U-235 is known as enrichment, and it has several levels, purposes, methods, and end results. It is also important to note that both U-238 and U-235 are chemically the same element. This means that you can’t separate U-235 from U-238 by a chemical process, you’ve got to do it mechanically.
Let’s imagine that you are invited into a stadium that is filled with 1000 nearly identical clones, all dressed the same way. Seven of those clones have a weight that is only 500 grams, or about a half of a pound less than the other 993 clones. Those seven clones are wanted because they have a slightly higher metabolism or something. When you are invited to find those seven clones, everyone is wearing the same clothing, has the same haircut, and has the same amounts of perfume on. How do you find the seven clones that you want? Welcome to just some of the challenges of uranium enrichment.
Grades of Uranium Enrichment.
These are simplistic numbers that can vary slightly depending on application, ore type, and other factors. Nevertheless, they are close enough for the purposes of explaining about the process. [1][2]
0.3% or Less Uranium-235: Depleted Uranium. Many commercial, industrial, and military uses.
0.7% Uranium-235: Common Uranium Ore. When milled this is called Yellow Cake.
3-5% Uranium-235: Also known as Lightly Enriched Uranium, LEU
20% Uranium-235: Used for creating medical isotopes, and for scientific research. [*]
85-90% Uranium-235 Weapons Grade. Also known as Highly Enriched Uranium, HEU
[*] 20% Enrichment. It is technically possible to create a fission detonation with a large enough mass of 20% enriched uranium. The required mass of uranium would be large, probably around 1000 pounds. This number could be lower if neutron reflective casing and booster isotopes were used. The result would likely be an inefficient, but probable successful fission reaction. However, the work required to enrich from 20% to 90% is not as significant as the work required to enrich from 0.7% to even 3% LEU.
Okay then, let’s make a nuclear bomb (figuratively).
First, we are going to need some Uranium-238 ore. Easy breezy, Iran has uranium mines. The primary uranium mine in Iran is Gachin. It is located about 18 nautical miles west of the city of Bandar Abbas, along Iran’s southern coast. Truthfully, it was difficult even to obtain information about where Iran got its Uranium, as many sources claim that there are no natural uranium deposits in Iran, a claim clearly false. Scientists in Japan have even developed a method to extract uranium from seawater, though the process is rumored to be stupidly expensive.
Above: Iran’s Primary Uranium Mine, Gachin. Image Credit: Google Earth.
As part of the terms of the Nuclear-Nonproliferation-Treaty, party nations can buy and sell reactor grade reactor fuel on the open market without restrictions. This means that Iran has two potential sources of LEU, the open market, and its own uranium mines. Three sources if you count the technology to extract uranium from sea water. Standard uranium ore contains less than 1% U-235 isotopes. Clearly Iran can obtain uranium enriched 3-5% on the open market, and they can also enrich their own ore to this level. This is important to know, because it is an internationally recognized right of nation states to have nuclear reactors, and to enrich their own fuel for those reactors. Iran, at this point, has not broken any laws or treaties.
As of November 2020 Iran, was in possession of about 3613.8 kilograms (kg) of LEU, hexafluoride mass, all enriched below 5 percent, or the equivalent of 2442.9 kg of uranium mass. (According to the IAEA) At that time (November 2020), Iran already had enough enriched uranium to produce one bomb, however the uranium they possessed was not enriched to the 90% level required for a weapon. To convert the 5% fuel grate LEU to weapons grade would require about 3-6 months of further enrichment. If those figures are correct, this would mean that between February and May of 2021 would be the time frame for Iran to have enough weapons grade material to produce 2 atomic weapons.
(Note: While not ideal, some simple multiplication can give us some idea of how much Uranium Ore might be necessary to produce the 3616 kg of LEU in the possession of Iran. 3616 x 3.5 (a base figure for LEU, and assuming no waste and perfect enrichment) = 12,656 kg. This is the minimum weight of uranium ore, or Yellow Cake required to obtain 3616kg of LEU. Though in all probability a figure closer to 15,000 kg would be more realistic. Iran may have mined 149 metric tons of Uranium Ore between 2015 and 2019 [3]. It is therefore probably realistic that all the uranium Iran is enriching was produced from their own mines.)
There are three ways to enrich uranium as I understand it. Iran can either use gas centrifuge, gaseous diffusion or laser separation. The current method reportedly used by Iran is gas centrifuge enrichment, so we’ll concentrate on that method. Notice that all methods seem to require conversion of Uranium ore from…ore, or rock, to a gas. To do this uranium ore is put in a big coffee grinder (simplistically speaking). The result should be milled uranium ore, also known as Yellow Cake. Yellow Cake is combined with Nitric Acid, Ammonia, and other chemicals to create the gas used for enrichment, Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6). I’m not a chemist, so if you’re interested in converting yellow cake to hexafluoride gas, you might want to look that up. Remember, this is just the basics. Whatever method used; Uranium hexafluoride (UF6) is the gas we need to continue the enrichment process.
Now that we have UF6, we need to spin it in cascading gas centrifuges. As we spin the UF6 the heavier U-238 separates from the lighter U-235 (the stuff we want). The U-235 cascades into the next centrifuge in line to continue the enrichment process. The U-238 will be recycled to a lower centrifuge in the line of cascading centrifuges to recover any atoms of U-235 we might have missed in the first cycle of centrifugal separation. We’ll want to get every atom of U-235 out that we can. Furthermore, depleted uranium, mostly U-238 has uses as well. [4]
(Depleted Uranium is used for armor for tanks, weights, and armor piercing tank shells, as well as medical and scientific uses such as gyroscopic compasses. Remember, uranium is very dense, and in the game of penetrating armor, dense is better. It’s also been used as ballast in some racing sailboats to reduce hydrodynamic drag from a larger piece of lead, iron, or cement. Depleted uranium is 68.4% denser than lead. Since I don’t know where else to put this, but I thought it important; Uranium metal is flammable. It will burn and burn at extremely high temperatures.)
As you might imagine, trying to pull individual molecules out of UF6 gas, is something of a delicate process. Those centrifuges need to spin very precisely, and at specific speeds. At the same time, there is a mechanical limit to how fast you can spin an aluminum centrifuge, reportedly 1400 RPM is the automatic safety limit. If you spin the centrifuge too fast, it breaks. Breaking centrifuges filled with acidic & mildly radioactive gas probably is not a good thing.
Because of the small amounts of U-235 molecules in natural uranium ore (0.7%), this is going to take a large quantity of centrifuges, at least if we want any actual weapons grade uranium at the end. Reports I’ve heard put the number of centrifuges in Iran at between 10,000 and 20,000 back in 2015 timeframe. Those numbers are important, and they were critical in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. (I.E. The Obama-Iran-Europe nuclear deal) From what I understand, there are some hard and fast rules on how fast you can enrich uranium using a centrifuge. This means the number and size of the centrifuges, how many are operating, and what grade of UF6 they process, matters a lot. Currently the IAEA says that Iran is operating 6429 centrifuges and installing upgraded models periodically.
Here is where we come to what is called the “break out time.” The breakout time is the time it takes for someone to produce the quantity of HEU for a single atomic weapon, or about 55 kg if they go all out. At the time the JCPOA was signed, the breakout time for Iran was quoted as being between 6 weeks and 14 months. It is important to note that the breakout time only gives Iran enough weapons grade uranium for one bomb. As I am writing this, Iran has said publicly that they will be increasing their level of uranium enrichment to 20%, much higher than needed for reactor fuel of less than 5 percent. Here is a simple breakdown of the IAEA report. [5]
Above: A Satellite image of the Natanz Uranium Enrichment Facility. Image Credit: Google Earth.
Above: Fordow (Fordo?) Enrichment Facility. Image Credit: Google Earth. (I’ve seen the spelling of Fordow several ways, I don’t know which is correct.)
As the UF6 is enriched in the centrifuges, going from 0.7% to 3%, 5%, 20%, and then to 90%, the UF6 will then require conversion back from Uranium Hexafluoride gas and into Uranium metal. This apparently isn’t a hugely difficult process, but it does pose challenges due to the higher level of volatility of Highly Enriched Uranium. Uranium, either LEU for fuel rods in reactors, or HEU for weapons will need to be in metallic form.
Whatever the enrichment level of the uranium is, it is important to note that Plutonium-239, a fissile material used in multistage thermonuclear weapons, and commonly used in implosion type weapons, is created from U-238, not fissile U-235. Uranium fuel rods of LEU, when used in a reactor, will split atoms to levels necessary for thermal reactions, but below the criticality levels necessary for a fission explosion. The splitting of U-235 will cause neutrons to strike U-238 atoms. Some of those neutrons will bond with the atoms of U-238 and create Plutonium-239. P-239 is made in ALL uranium-based reactors.
One of the better methods to increase the levels of Plutonium-239 produced in a reactor, is to use heavy water (deuterium oxide, 2H2O, D2O) as a neutron moderator in the reactor core. Heavy water will cause more neutrons to be reflected into the reactor, and some of those neutrons will interact with Uranium-238, becoming Plutonium-239. While I am attempting to avoid getting too technical, I do want you to see the entire picture. Therefore, I felt it was important to inform you that Plutonium-239 is a fissile material, and it is be made in a conventional nuclear powerplant as a simple byproduct. Every single nuclear reactor in operation will produce Plutonium-239 to some extent if that reactor is using Uranium-238. The question then becomes how the reactor is designed, as some designs make recovery of the Plutonium-239 easier or produce it in larger quantities.
Let me give you an imperfect analogy to make this subject easier to digest. If you are like most of us, you have a gasoline powered car. Gasoline is burned to release energy; this energy moves the pistons in your car’s motor. The pistons move up and down (or side to side…) and the movement of the pistons turns a crankshaft. The crank shaft turns gears which connect to your differential, which connects to the axels, which turns the wheels of your car. The gasoline burned in your engine turns into exhaust gasses which are vented from the engine, and out the exhaust pipe. Now, in this analogy, pretend that your car has a valve in your muffler that catches the exhaust gases. Let’s further pretend that those exhaust gasses are themselves flammable and may be used to power the engine of your car if recycled. That is what a nuclear reactor does to make Plutonium-239 from Uranium-238, in highly simplistic terms. The fuel rods of LEU are not burned up by a nuclear reactor, unlike the gasoline in your car’s engine. The fuel rods are converted to other elements, just one of which is Plutonium-239. Does it make a little better sense now?
The critical mass of Plutonium-239 necessary to create a supercritical fission reaction has a base of about 22 pounds or 11 kilograms. Supposedly this would be a sphere about the size of a grapefruit. By covering the sphere with a neutron refractory material, such as beryllium or tungsten, this critical mass can be further reduced to a large degree.
One tragic example of this is a plutonium pit known as the Demon Core. During early experiments into criticality at Los Alamos National Laboratories a scientist accidently dropped a tungsten block on a pile of other tungsten blocks surrounding the Demon Core on August 21st, 1945. The core went critical for a split second, releasing a massive burst of radiation. The young scientist quickly knocked the tungsten block away with his bare hands, but it was too late, he was already dead. The demon core was just below critical mass, about 3.5 inches in diameter. The introduction of the neutron reflecting tungsten blocks lowered the threshold of critical mass.
Haroutune “Harry” Krikor Daghlian Jr. received an estimated dose of 510 rem of neutron radiation in under a second. He died of radiation poisoning on September 15th, 1945.
On the 21st of May 1946 Louis Slotin was performing another criticality experiment with the Demon Core, which had killed Harry Daghlian. In this experiment Louis Slotin was using a neutron reflecting beryllium cover to see how close to criticality he could get the Demon Core. He held the beryllium cover off the Demon Core with the blade of a flathead screwdriver while the core was surrounded by tungsten blocks and further beryllium neutron reflectors. While holding the neutron reflecting cover off the core, with only the width of the screwdriver blade…the screwdriver slipped. This time there were other people in the room. Again, the scientist did the first thing he could think of and used his hand to knock the pieces apart.
Louis Slotin then yelled for no one to move. He tossed pieces of chalk to everyone, ordering them to mark their exact location at the instant the core went critical. They marked the floor, and then most fled the room and tried to get the image of the blue flash out of their memories. Louis Slotin insisted that the doctors’ study him for each of the few days he had remaining. He too was a dead man the moment the screwdriver slipped. Despite every attempt by the medical staff to save his life, Louis Slotin died of acute radiation poisoning on the 30th of May 1946.
One study into the incident cited that Louis Slotin received about 2,100 rem, equivalent to a fatal dose of radiation four times over. Yet, despite his clear lack of respect for the dangers involved in his experiment and the use of the screwdriver of all things… Slotin’s quick thinking by removing the neutron reflector did probably save lives. Additionally, his order for everyone to mark their exact location on the floor with chalk did further medical understanding of how radiation poisoning effects humans. Slotin’s torso, I.E. his chalk mark on the floor was only 18 inches from the Demon Core when it went critical. In Epilogue, after the death of Slotin, someone made the wise decision to stop allowing young dumb-ass scientists, or anyone, from playing with plutonium cores with their bare hands.
Above: The probable correct cutaway of Little Boy, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima Japan.
In the above designs the pieces of Highly Enriched Uranium are separated and kept below the level of critical mass. (With more than a screwdriver…) When the explosive or gunpowder charge ignites in the back of the bomb, the hollow slug of HEU is propelled down the barrel and towards the target plug, also made of HEU. The Tungsten Carbide Neutron Reflector reflects the neutrons attempting to escape the now critical mass of HEU. The combination of the two smaller masses will then initiate a chain reaction, resulting in Super Criticality. Congratulations, you’ve created fission.
Iran has had research reactors, built in the United States, since the early 1960s. Atomic research has been underway in Iran since the Johnson administration. Those reactors were given to Iran under the “Atoms for Peace” program begun by President Eisenhower. They are not stupid. Given that the United States itself, without the internet, made Little Boy and Fat Man (an implosion type plutonium bomb) in the 1940s Iran will probably do better if they ever make the choice to pursue atomic weapons. They have computers. They can see what we did. Scientists learn from other scientists, they study, experiment, and get better.
What might an Iranian bomb look like? There are some conclusions that we might draw on what type of device Iran might produce if they were to produce a nuclear bomb. First, we know that Iran has internet access. It seems silly, but much of the information that was highly classified until the end of the cold war, is now mostly open source. Information has a way of getting out, no matter how much you might try and prevent it. I’ve found open-source technical drawings and diagrams on thermonuclear weapons that date back to the 1970s.
If I can find it, Iran can find it. This means that Iran has access to some seventy years of nuclear research, nuclear weapons tests from around the world, and advances in mathematics research. Additionally, Iran has access to much better technology today than the United States did when we created our first atomic bombs in the 1940s. Iran has computer systems to aid in research and modeling, and when you combine computer processing power with the availability of information, this would speed up and improve Iran’s weapons program significantly. Let’s not forget that CNC machine tools enable a very precise milling of sub-critical pieces of HEU into bomb components. Back in the 1940s, American bomb components didn’t have CNC machines and computer modeling to help. Do I need to even mention commercially available laser measuring instruments? The technology is much more advanced, and Iran isn’t starting from scratch.
Furthermore, Iran has access to the scientific research conducted by Pakistan and North Korea during the nuclear weapons development programs of those countries. Iran will learn from the mistakes of others, and this also speeds up the process. Here is what I heard, Iran flat out asked Pakistan for an atomic bomb. Pakistan replied that they were more than willing to give Iran access to the scientists, all the research, and help with the enrichment, but they would not simply give a bomb or nuclear material to Iran. Basically, this resulted in “We’ll help you, but you’ve got to do it yourself, just like we did.” Now, this brings us to the question of what types of bombs did Pakistan produce?
Most sources indicate that Pakistan produced an implosion type weapon with a yield of around 30 kt for their first weapons tests. This caused me to check what other first time nuclear powers produced, almost everyone seems to go for an implosion type design the first time. Later bombs in development programs sometimes then go to a thermonuclear, I.E. boosted type weapon. (Teller–Ulam configuration) A basic implosion or gun type atomic bomb is a fission weapon. The atoms of the radioactive U235 split, releasing neutrons, and if there is a level of material required for fission, or a critical mass, then the splitting of the atom will cause a chain reaction, supercriticality with neutrons smashing into other U235 atoms, causing fission.
Above: A possible configuration of a multi-stage thermonuclear weapon in the Teller–Ulam configuration. Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org
Above: the detonation sequence of a thermonuclear weapon. Public Domain Image: https://commons.wikimedia.org
Thermonuclear weapons, hydrogen bombs, etc., multistage fusion weapons. Fusion is what the sun does, and it is the combining of lighter elements like hydrogen isotopes, (tritium etc.). So far it seems that a pure fusion bomb, using the hydrogen isotopes deuterium and tritium, hasn’t yet been invented. We know it’s possible because the sun is really just a big fusion reactor but creating the same reaction without a fission ignition device hasn’t yet been done so far as I can tell. Furthermore, thermonuclear weapons are termed “multistage” because they use both a fission ignition and fusion booster to increase the explosive yield.
There is a theory that a high-yield-multi-stage-fission, or possibly fusion device could be developed using anti-matter. In theory a few micrograms of anti-matter, when injected into a subcritical mass of otherwise unsuitable material would force an initial fission reaction by the interaction of anti-protons with protons. The way I understand it, the anti-matter would reduce the requirement for neutron reflecting materials which assisted the subcritical mass in reaching supercriticality by better management of the neutrons which are working to split further atomic particles. However, there are not many methods to create and store anti-matter, and all of them seem to require the possession of a particle collider, which Iran does not seem to have. Let’s be realistic, if you can produce usable quantities of anti-matter needed for an antimatter boosted super critical event, you aren’t worried about making an atomic bomb. Though nuclear weapons are significantly safer to handle and store than antimatter, so I suppose there is that.
Is this where I mention that bananas produce anti-matter? I bet that feeling of security you had two minutes ago just dove off into the depths of your subconscious. Apparently, your average banana produces one positron every 75 minutes. Don’t worry too much though, it’s only the natural decay of potassium-40. [6]
Now that you know the basics behind the construction of atomic weapons, let’s talk about the use of the damn things. There is a rule with atomic weapons, though no one will admit it. But I pride myself in my honesty, I mostly just lie to myself… Here is the unvarnished truth about using nuclear weapons today. “The first one costs you everything, after that they’re free.” Once you’ve committed to using an atomic weapon against someone, you might as well use a bunch. The diplomatic and political fallout will be roughly the same…with one exception. If you only use one, and you don’t use it on a city or civilian population.
I used Nukemap [7] simulations on Iran’s Uranium Enrichment Facility at Natanz. A full 200kt blast, impact delay detonated, not airburst. A bunker busting tactical nuclear weapon is one of the only ways I can see to reach into the deeply buried bunkers with kinetic air dropped weapons. Nukemap simulations showed that around 5000 people would die in the blast. That is truly scary. Because when we talk about a remote and isolated site that cannot easily be destroyed with conventional weapons, nuclear weapons are the only kinetic option assured to have the desired effect, with a side benefit of killing off a goodly portion of the brain trust. (Outside of a commando raid.)
When only 5000 some people will die, almost all of them military or scientists connected to the nuclear program, it looks politically feasible. It looks like good option, at first glance. (It isn’t. It’s national suicide.) It could be argued that a nuclear strike is the only way to fully eliminate the Iranian nuclear weapons program. Since Israel has said Iran will get the bomb “over our dead body”, they have just put a nuclear strike on the table. 5000 dead in the Iranian military and weapons program is politically palatable to other world leaders. It would be acceptable, and that is very, very scary. If 5000 was okay yesterday, is 10,000? What about 50,000? If 50,000 is cool, 250,000 is only five times more…Shit, might as well just smoke their capital… You see where this is going? The logic snowballs quickly into full blown genocide.
From the information I have been able to gather. Here is a list of reasons why, when, and how Israel may use their collection of nuclear weapons.
1) A successful military penetration into populated areas within Israel's post-1949 (pre-1967) borders.
2) The destruction of the Israeli Air Force.
3) The exposure of Israeli cities to massive and devastating air attacks or to possible chemical or biological attacks.
4) The use of nuclear weapons against Israeli territory.
5) Clear intelligence information that a nation or group is about to attack Israel, or an Israeli citizen with Chemical Biological or Nuclear weapons.
6) The “Samson Option” (last resort destruction).
What I am assuming is that Iran has roughly the same policy (actual policy, not what they say to the western media or their own people), as Israel. If they ever have nuclear weapons, they will use them if they feel the need. To be fair, in the end, that is the real policy of every nuclear power.
The United States officially has a quasi “No First Use” policy, that having a loophole or three, which makes the U.S. Policy in line with Iran and Israel. “We’ll use them if we feel the need.” The United States also has a policy about Biological or Chemical weapons. Basically, this policy is “We’ll nuke you.” It means that if country X attacks, might attack, or is planning to attack the USA with a biological or Chemical weapon, we will use atomic weapons on you first, during, or after, your attack on us.
I am not saying that Israel will 100% use their own atomic weapons against Iran. I am not saying that Iran is 100% headed towards becoming a nuclear armed state. I’m not saying that Iran is 100% geared towards actually attempting to wipe Israel off the map. I am saying that Israel will and probably is talking about their options, and they do not have many good ones. Every option Israel has, at this point, sucks. Nothing is going to go down easy. And in a situation with only bad choices, a limited tactical strike on a few isolated sites connected to the Iranian nuclear weapons program is going to look like a clean solution to a complex problem. Remember my background is military, not nuclear engineering. From a purely military perspective, a limited nuclear strike is somewhat appealing. But politics matters, even old, crippled soldiers know that.
In a September 2020 interview the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, said this about nuclear weapons. I think it bears mentioning. It’s also a good place to close out this issue of The Sanford Report.
“Nuclear weapons do not provide security. Look at the only possessor of nuclear weapons in our region, [Israel] are they secure? No, they are not. Nuclear weapons do not provide security. Once more, it is religiously prohibited, it is haraam. So, it is immaterial how much enriched uranium we have.” [8]
(Note: I sincerely hope i linked the correct interview with Foreign Minister Zarif for the above quote. I watched hours of them and used the link listed next to that quote in my notes. Either way the interview is worth watching, he is an engaging speaker with a sense of humor. -The Author)
Sources:
[1] https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Uranium_enrichment#cite_note-5
[2]https://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-enrichment.html
[4] http://www.chm.bris.ac.uk/motm/uf6/uf6v.htm
[6] https://www.symmetrymagazine.org/2009/07/23/antimatter-from-bananas
https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/
[7] https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/
[8]